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WOLF AT THE DOOR: ISSUES OF PLACE 
AND RACE IN THE USE OF THE “KNOCK 
AND TALK” POLICING TECHNIQUE 
Andrew Eppich* 
Abstract: The procedure known as “knock and talk” allows police to ap-
proach a dwelling, knock on the door, and ask questions of the inhabitant 
with the goal of obtaining entry into the dwelling. This is a popular polic-
ing technique because probable cause or a warrant is not required. This 
Note analyzes the effect of knock and talk on conceptions of privacy and 
space held by those most frequently targeted: low income and minority in-
dividuals. It argues that the curtilage doctrine, which protects the area sur-
rounding the home, does not assist these individuals. In addition, this Note 
demonstrates that knock and talk can be abused in two ways: through im-
properly obtained consent and police-created exigent circumstances. Fi-
nally, this Note argues that the use of knock and talk undermines efforts at 
community policing and has the potential to harm the population it sup-
posedly protects. 
Introduction 
 On October 13, 2005, police officers in Lexington, Kentucky exe-
cuted a “controlled buy” drug operation near an apartment complex 
where an informant had purchased crack cocaine from a drug dealer.1 
Upon completion of the sale, an undercover police officer signaled 
nearby officers to make an arrest.2 Officers advanced toward a breeze-
way in the apartment complex and heard an apartment door slam 
shut.3 The officers detected a strong odor of marijuana emanating 
                                                                                                                      
* Articles Editor, Boston College Journal of Law & Social Justice (2011–2012). 
1 Kentucky v. King, 131 S. Ct. 1849, 1854 (2011). 
2 Id. 
3 Id. The Kentucky Supreme Court discarded the argument that “hot pursuit” justified 
the warrantless entry into the apartment by noting that “[a]n important element of the 
hot pursuit exception is the suspect’s knowledge that he is, in fact, being pursued.” King v. 
Commonwealth, 302 S.W.3d 649, 653–54 (Ky. 2010). The Kentucky Supreme Court stated 
that there was no evidence that the suspect knew he was being pursued. Id. at 653. The 
United States Supreme Court declined to answer the question of hot pursuit in this case. 
See King v. Commonwealth, 302 S.W.3d 649 (Ky. 2010), cert. granted, 131 S. Ct. 61 (Sept. 28, 
2010) (No. 09–1272); Petition for Writ of Certiorari, 131 S. Ct. 61 (No. 09–1272). 
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from the apartment located in the back-left of the breezeway.4 Because 
of the strength and location of the odor, police reasoned that the back-
left apartment door had recently been opened.5 One officer knocked 
loudly on it and announced his presence.6 The officers heard move-
ment from inside the apartment, which led them to believe that the 
suspect was about to destroy evidence.7 
 Instead of waiting to obtain a warrant, the officers forced entry 
into the apartment.8 Inside, the police discovered Hollis King and two 
other individuals smoking marijuana, and a search revealed crack and 
powder cocaine in the apartment.9 The officers, however, did not lo-
cate the suspected drug dealer they were chasing, as that suspect had 
hidden in the back-right breezeway apartment.10 Despite entry into the 
wrong apartment, the officers arrested King and, subsequently, the pre-
siding judge would not suppress the evidence from the warrantless en-
try and search.11 King pled guilty to various drug offenses.12 
* * * 
 On September 26, 1994, police officers in Wisconsin were patrol-
ling and broadly looking for what they believed to be vehicles used for 
drug trafficking.13 They noticed a Honda Prelude with Florida license 
plates in the parking lot of a motel and decided to investigate the iden-
tity of the driver.14 By running the license plates through a police com-
puter system, the officers determined that the car belonged to a Mr. 
Solis, who had a criminal record and a suspended license.15 
                                                                                                                      
4 King, 131 S. Ct. at 1854. 
5 Id. 
6 Id. 
7 Id. 
8 Id. The officers kicked the door open and executed a protective sweep upon entry. 
Id. The protective sweep doctrine allows police officers to engage in a cursory search of 
the premises—thereby protecting the officers’ safety—when they possess reasonable suspi-
cion that the scene of arrest poses a danger. See Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 327 (1990). 
9 King, 131 S. Ct. at 1854. 
10 Id. at 1855. 
11 Id. 
12 Id. King entered a conditional guilty plea for the charges of drug trafficking in a 
controlled substance, possession of marijuana, and persistent felony offender (second 
degree), and received an eleven year prison sentence. King, 302 S.W.3d at 652. 
13 United States v. Jerez, 108 F.3d 684, 686 (7th Cir. 1997). Specifically, the officers 
were looking for “target vehicles,” which are vans or two-door vehicles that have license 
plates from California, Texas, Florida, or Arizona. Id. The police consider these states to be 
“source states” for drug trafficking. Id. 
14 Id. 
15 Id. Solis was previously arrested for smuggling contraband into a jail. Id. 
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 The officers returned that evening with the hope of getting Solis 
to consent to a search of his motel room.16 At approximately 11 P.M., 
and proceeding without a warrant, the officers took turns knocking on 
the door but heard no noise from inside the room.17 One of the offi-
cers stated “Police. Open up the door. We’d like to talk to you.”18 An-
other officer knocked on the room’s window while the first continued 
knocking on the door.19 Only after one-and-a-half to two minutes did 
the officers hear sound from within the room.20 
 The officer at the window used his flashlight to shine light between 
the drapes, where he saw an individual move underneath the covers of 
the bed.21 Solis eventually opened the drapes and saw the officer at the 
window, who stated “Sheriff’s Department. Can we talk to you? Would 
you open up the door?”22 Solis shook his head in agreement and 
opened the door for the officers.23 They displayed their police badges 
and asked if they could enter the room to talk to Solis.24 Upon entry 
into the room, the officers noticed a marijuana cigarette and then 
asked if they could search the motel room.25 Solis subsequently ges-
tured that he would allow a search and the officers discovered large 
amounts of cocaine.26 The district court denied Solis’s motion to sup-
press and he pled guilty, reserving his right to appeal.27 
* * * 
 The police officers in these two cases, Kentucky v. King and United 
States v. Jerez, used the tactic of knocking on dwelling doors to gain en-
try.28 While a police officer’s knock on the door may not seem trou-
bling on its face, this “knock and talk” technique is powerful and fre-
                                                                                                                      
16 Id. at 686–87. 
17 Id. at 687. 
18 Jerez, 108 F.3d at 687. 
19 Id. 
20 Id. 
21 Id. 
22 Id. 
23 Jerez, 108 F.3d at 687. 
24 Id. 
25 Id. at 688. 
26 Id. 
27 Id. at 687. Solis had a counterpart staying with him at the hotel that also pled guilty. Id. 
28 See King, 131 S. Ct. at 1854; Jerez, 108 F.3d at 686–87. Even though the defendants in 
Jerez were in a motel room and not a home, the Supreme Court has held that the lawful 
occupant of a hotel room is protected from unreasonable searches and seizures, much like 
“a tenant of a house, or the occupant of a room in a boarding house . . . .” Stoner v. Cali-
fornia, 376 U.S. 483, 490 (1964). 
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quently utilized.29 As King and Jerez demonstrate, officers may search a 
dwelling without a warrant simply by knocking on the door and asking 
for permission.30 The ease and effectiveness with which police officers 
can use knock and talk to conduct warrantless searches is making the 
technique more prevalent.31 
 King and Jerez have something else in common: the officers en-
gaged in questionable policing to stop drug trafficking.32 Both arrests 
occurred in areas associated with high levels of drug activity.33 Appeals 
courts in both cases overturned the convictions due to the officers’ 
Fourth Amendment right violations.34 While these cases show the limits 
of knock and talk, they also demonstrate the methods police will em-
ploy to gain warrantless entry into a dwelling.35 Normally, when con-
sent is given or when police believe—using their own judgment—
evidence is being destroyed, courts validate the dwelling’s search with-
out prior judicial review.36 
                                                                                                                     
 This Note discusses two different uses for the knock and talk tech-
nique.37 First, police can use knock and talk to search a dwelling be-
 
 
29 See Craig M. Bradley, “Knock and Talk” and the Fourth Amendment, 84 Ind. L.J. 1099, 
1099, 1104 (2009) (noting that, especially when combined with other police techniques such 
as plain view and search incident to arrest, “‘knock and talk’ is a powerful investigative tech-
nique.”). For example, the Orlando Weekly reports that the Central Florida Orange County 
Sheriff’s Office “alone performs an estimated 300 such [knock and talk] encounters each 
month on unsuspecting residents.” William Dean Hinton, Knock and Talk, Orlando Wkly., 
Jan. 9, 2003, http://www2.orlandoweekly.com/features/story.asp?id=2940. There is an en-
tire squad within the sheriff’s office dedicated to carrying out knock and talks. Id. 
30 See King, 131 S. Ct. at 1854; Jerez, 108 F.3d at 687–88; Bradley, supra note 29, at 1099. 
31 See Bryan M. Abramoske, Note, It Doesn’t Matter What They Intended: The Need for Objec-
tive Permissibility Review of Police-Created Exigencies in “Knock and Talk” Investigations, 41 Suf-
folk U. L. Rev. 561, 564–65 (2008) (stating that “[i]n many cases, the person answering 
the door consents to a police search, which makes the procedure highly effective. Police 
have noted this effectiveness, leading to expanded use of the procedure.”) (footnote omit-
ted). 
32 See King, 131 S. Ct. at 1854; Jerez, 108 F.3d at 686–87; Bradley, supra note 29, at 1104. 
33 See King, 131 S. Ct. at 1854; Jerez, 108 F.3d at 686. 
34 See King, 131 S. Ct. at 1855; Jerez, 108 F.3d at 695–96. 
35 See King, 131 S. Ct. at 1854; Jerez, 108 F.3d at 686–87; Bradley, supra note 29, at 1104 
(stating that, during knock and talks, “[o]nly when police have employed ‘overbearing tac-
tics,’ such as ‘drawn weapons, raised voices, or coercive demands,’ have their actions been 
faulted”) (emphasis omitted) (quoting United States v. Thomas, 430 F.3d 274, 277–78 (6th 
Cir. 2005) (quoting Nash v. United States, 117 F. App’x 992, 993 (2004) (per curiam), vacated, 
544 U.S. 995 (2005))). 
36 See Bradley, supra note 29, at 1109–17; Marcy Strauss, Reconstructing Consent, 92 J. 
Crim. L. & Criminology 211, 212 (2001) (“Only if the police behave with some extreme 
degree of coercion beyond that inherent in the police-citizen confrontation will a court 
vitiate the consent.”). 
37 See Bradley, supra note 29, at 1109–17. Professor Craig Bradley also discusses a third 
scenario, where police utilize knock and talk for the purpose of fulfilling an arrest warrant. 
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cause probable cause exists that a crime was, is, or will be committed.38 
This case invokes exigent circumstances—a recognized exception to 
the warrant requirement—to enter a dwelling when police believe evi-
dence is being destroyed within.39 Second, police may use knock and 
talk to convince a resident to consent to a search.40 Once an individual 
consents, the search is deemed constitutional and any evidence discov-
ered is admissible at trial.41 
 This Note focuses on the uses and potential abuses of knock and 
talk, particularly as it applies to individuals living in low income or high 
crime areas. Courts are allowing knock and talk to compromise privacy 
from intrusive police activity, even though “physical entry of the home 
is the chief evil against which the wording of the Fourth Amendment is 
directed . . . .”42 Specifically, this Note discusses the impact of pretext in 
law enforcement and how knock and talk can be easily used to target 
minorities without ex ante judicial review.43 
 Part I of this Note discusses the development of knock and talk by 
explaining the technique’s implementation and its legal framework as 
                                                                                                                      
Id. at 1117–22. While this Note focuses only on situations where police do not possess a 
warrant, issues of exigency and consent that can arise in Bradley’s third scenario are dis-
cussed in Part III. See id.; infra Part III.A–B. 
38 See King, 131 S. Ct. at 1860 (discussing if and when police must halt an investigation 
to obtain a warrant in the face of sufficient probable cause); Bradley, supra note 29, at 
1109; Geoffrey C. Sonntag, Note, Probable Cause, Reasonable Suspicion, or Mere Speculation?: 
Holding Police to a Higher Standard in Destruction of Evidence Exigency Cases, 42 Washburn L.J. 
629, 651 (2003) (“Probable cause is . . . universally required in destruction of evidence 
exigency cases . . .”). 
39 See Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 770–71 (1966) (holding the determina-
tion of appellant’s intoxication level through blood testing constitutional when the delay 
necessary to obtain a warrant threatened the destruction of evidence). Schmerber was the 
first time the Supreme Court upheld “a warrantless search conducted to prevent the de-
struction of evidence.” Sonntag, supra note 38, at 632. The actual standard for implemen-
tation of the destruction of evidence exigency exception has led to inconsistency among 
the Circuit Courts. See Barbara C. Salken, Balancing Exigency and Privacy in Warrantless 
Searches to Prevent Destruction of Evidence: The Need for a Rule, 39 Hastings L.J. 283, 288 
(1988) (noting that the Circuits “do not evaluate claims of exigency in the same manner”); 
Sonntag, supra note 38, at 630. 
40 See Jerez, 108 F.3d at 686–87; H. Morley Swingle & Kevin M. Zoellner, “Knock and 
Talk” Consent Searches: If Called by a Panther, Don’t Anther, 55 J. Mo. B. 25, 25 (1999) (“The 
typical ‘knock and talk’ simply involves police officers marching up to someone’s front 
door, knocking, and requesting consent to search the home.”). 
41 See Christo Lassiter, Consent to Search by Ignorant People, 39 Tex. Tech L. Rev. 1171, 
1171 (2007) (“A consent search requires neither a warrant nor probable cause, and all 
evidence discovered may be seized pursuant to the plain view doctrine.”). 
42 See United States v. U.S. Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297, 313 (1972). 
43 See Brian J. Foley, Policing from the Gut: Anti-Intellectualism in American Criminal Procedure, 
69 Md. L. Rev. 261, 340 (2010) (arguing that “when police do not have to give reasons for 
discretionary searches or seizures, conscious and unconscious racism may prevail”). 
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developed by the Supreme Court. Part II analyzes the impact of knock 
and talk on race-based policing and demonstrates that it can be used to 
harass and target minorities and the poor. Part III examines two prob-
lematic scenarios that knock and talk creates: consent searches and 
searches based on the destruction of evidence. Finally, Part IV suggests 
that knock and talk shames and humiliates community members, par-
ticularly when they are innocent, and breeds mistrust in police. Thus, 
knock and talk undermines community policing and ultimately works 
against the community’s protection. 
I. A Closer Look at Knock and Talk: How It Works and Why 
Police Find it Useful 
 Knock and talk is an effective policing technique where an officer 
knocks on a dwelling door to speak to an inhabitant, thereby gleaning 
useful information or receiving permission to search the premises.44 
While officers are not allowed to intrude into the home, the doctrine of 
curtilage allows police officers to approach a dwelling’s door to ask 
questions.45 
A. How it Works: The Knock and Talk Technique 
 Knock and talk is a technique where police officers, acting without 
a warrant and often without probable cause, knock on the door of a 
dwelling and ask for permission to search.46 Police also use knock and 
talk to obtain information from the inhabitant through personally 
questioning them.47 This technique can be used for any dwelling, from 
a rural single-family home to a crowded apartment complex in an inner 
city.48  
                                                                                                                      
44 See Bradley, supra note 29, at 1111; Carrie Leonetti, Open Fields in the Inner City: Appli-
cation of the Curtilage Doctrine to Urban and Suburban Areas, 15 Geo. Mason U. C.R. L.J. 297, 
311–12; Strauss, supra note 36, at 211 n.2; Marc L. Waite, Note, Reining in “Knock and Talk” 
Investigations: Using Missouri v. Seibert to Curtail an End-Run Around the Fourth Amendment, 
41 Val. U. L. Rev. 1335, 1338–39 (2007). 
45 See Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 179 (1984); United States v. Cephas, 254 
F.3d 488, 493–94 (4th Cir. 2001); United States v. Tobin, 923 F.2d 1506, 1511 (11th Cir. 
1991); United States v. Hersh, 464 F.2d 228, 230, 232 (9th Cir. 1972); Wayne R. LaFave, 
Search and Seizure: A Treatise on the Fourth Amendment 474 (3rd ed. 2004). 
46 See Bradley, supra note 29, at 1111; Leonetti, supra note 44, at 311–12; Waite, supra 
note 44, at 1338–39. 
47 See Bradley, supra note 29, at 1104–05. 
48 See Leonetti, supra note 44, at 302–03, 311–13 (2005) (discussing the curtilage doc-
trine with respect to knock and talk in an urban setting, as compared to rural and subur-
ban neighborhoods). 
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 Police use the knock and talk technique because it is a simple and 
effective way of obtaining information.49 A large number of individuals 
tend to agree to a search of their home.50 An added benefit of knock 
and talk is that police can seize evidence or arrest inhabitants if drugs 
or other evidence of crime are in the officer’s plain view.51 The officer 
need only look past the inhabitant or through open windows and may 
do so without consent for a search.52 
 Knock and talk is effective when police believe they do not have 
the time or sufficient probable cause necessary to obtain a warrant but 
suspect that those inside are involved in illegal activity.53 Therefore, of-
ficers find it an important tool in the arsenal of policing techniques.54 
B. The Legal Framework Surrounding Knock and Talk 
 The home is an area where protection from police intrusion is at 
its apogee, even though other protections from police encounters tend 
to ebb and flow over time.55 Courts repeatedly reinforce the notion 
that the home is a person’s “castle.”56 Thus, police intrusions into the 
                                                                                                                      
49 See Bradley, supra note 29, at 1104 (“It is certainly appropriate for police to canvass a 
neighborhood following a crime to ascertain whether anyone has knowledge about the 
crime.”). 
50 See Strauss, supra note 36, at 211 n.2 (“In case after case, students read about sus-
pects who supposedly told the police without hesitation to ‘go right ahead and search,’ 
when incriminating evidence was obviously going to be discovered.”). 
51 See Bradley, supra note 29, at 1104. 
52 See id. 
53 See Kentucky v. King, 131 S. Ct. 1849, 1855 (2011) (noting that one officer’s testi-
mony persuaded the circuit court judge that he had to enter an apartment without a war-
rant, where that officer had concluded the occupants were in the act of destroying drug 
evidence); Swingle & Zoellner, supra note 40, at 25–26 (noting that knock and talk allows 
searches without probable cause or a warrant). 
54 See Hinton, supra note 29 (noting the usefulness of knock and talk for the Orange 
County Sheriff’s Office). 
55 See Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206, 211 (1966) (“Without question, the home is 
accorded the full range of Fourth Amendment protections.”); Anthony G. Amsterdam, 
Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 Minn. L. Rev. 349, 349 (1974) (“For clarity and 
consistency, the law of the fourth amendment is not the Supreme Court’s most successful 
product.”). 
56 See, e.g., Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 94 (1998) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“The 
people’s protection against unreasonable search and seizure in their ‘houses’ was drawn 
from the English common-law maxim, ‘A man’s home is his castle.’”); Payton v. New York, 
445 U.S. 573, 601 (1980) (acknowledging the Court’s “overriding respect for the sanctity 
of the home that has been embedded in our traditions since the origins of the Republic”); 
Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 624–28 (1886) (noting that, regarding the history of 
the Fourth Amendment, the use of exploratory searches of the home was one of the pri-
mary reasons for the American revolution against British rule). 
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home implicate the protections against unreasonable searches and sei-
zures provided by the Fourth Amendment.57 
                                                                                                                     
1. The Rise of Knock and Talk 
 While the phrase “knock and talk” did not appear in the lexicon 
before 1991, earlier cases indicate that its unrestricted use would not be 
permitted.58 The issue arose in Johnson v. United States, a case with facts 
similar to those in Kentucky v. King.59 In Johnson, a confidential infor-
mant told police officers that individuals were smoking opium in a ho-
tel room.60 The officers approached the door to the hotel room and 
detected a strong odor of opium.61 After knocking on the door, a voice 
on the other side asked who was there and one of the officers identified 
himself as a lieutenant.62 Johnson eventually opened the door and the 
lieutenant said “I want to talk to you a little bit,” whereupon Johnson 
“stepped back acquiescently and admitted [them].”63 After Johnson 
denied that there was an opium smell in the room, the officers placed 
her under arrest.64 A subsequent search incident to arrest uncovered 
opium and drug paraphernalia—both pieces of evidence admitted 
against her at trial.65 
 The Supreme Court held Johnson’s Fourth Amendment rights 
violated and, in doing so, made two points relevant to current knock 
 
57 See LaFave, supra note 45, at 474 (“[The home] is . . . quite clearly a place as to 
which there exists a justified expectation of privacy against unreasonable intrusion.”). 
58 See Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 12–13, 16 (1948); Swingle & Zoellner, su-
pra note 40, at 25 (stating that the phrase “knock and talk” calls for “nothing more than 
the application of well-established Fourth Amendment principles pertaining to consent 
searches”). 
59 See King, 131 S. Ct. at 1854; Johnson, 333 U.S. at 12. 
60 Johnson, 333 U.S. at 12. 
61 Id. The odor of illegal drugs created probable cause in both the King and Johnson 
cases. King, 131 S. Ct. at 1862; Johnson, 333 U.S. at 12–13. The Supreme Court has held that 
the odor of illegal drugs alone can create probable cause that a crime is being committed. 
Johnson, 333 U.S. at 13 (noting that a magistrate must find that the officer who smelled the 
drugs was “qualified to know the odor, and [the odor] is one sufficiently distinctive to 
identify a forbidden substance . . .”); Taylor v. United States, 286 U.S. 1, 6 (1932). Merely 
dissipating odors, however, do not create a destruction of evidence exigency because they 
“were not capable at any time of being reduced to possession for presentation to court.” 
Johnson, 333 U.S. at 15. 
62 Johnson, 333 U.S. at 12. 
63 Id. 
64 Id. 
65 Id. 
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and talk procedure.66 First, the Court stated that Johnson granted entry 
to the officers “in submission to authority rather than as an understand-
ing and intentional waiver of a constitutional right.”67 Second, the 
Court held that despite the odor of opium wafting outside the hotel 
room, the circumstances were not such that the officers were justified 
in entering the room without a warrant.68 The Court stated that “[n]o 
reason is offered for not obtaining a search warrant except the incon-
venience to the officers and some slight delay necessary to prepare pa-
pers and present the evidence to a magistrate.”69 The Court continued, 
“[i]f the officers in this case were excused from the constitutional duty 
of presenting their evidence to a magistrate, it is difficult to think of a 
case in which it should be required.”70 
2. Shifting to a Reasonable Expectation of Privacy Standard 
 Since Johnson’s unfavorable treatment of knock and talk in 1948, 
the Supreme Court’s conception of privacy began to shift from an em-
phasis on location to a personal right.71 The most important decision 
for understanding Fourth Amendment searches is the 1967 case of Katz 
v. United States.72 In Katz, FBI agents had investigated Katz for possible 
involvement in an illegal gambling operation.73 Without a warrant, 
                                                                                                                      
66 See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973) (“It is . . . well settled that 
one of the specifically established exceptions to the requirements of both a warrant and 
probable cause is a search that is conducted pursuant to consent.”); Johnson, 333 U.S. at 
16–17; Bradley, supra note 29, at 1103; David John Housholder, Note, Reconciling Consent 
Searches and Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence: Incorporating Privacy into the Test for Valid Consent 
Searches, 58 Vand. L. Rev. 1279, 1289, 1291–94 (2005) (discussing the voluntariness re-
quirement in granting consent for officers to search). 
67 Johnson, 333 U.S. at 13. 
68 Id. at 12, 14–15. The court stated that such justifying circumstances might include 
the likelihood of flight and the destruction or removal of evidence. Id. at 15. The court 
also noted that the search was of a permanent location, and not a vehicle. Id. 
69 Id. 
70 Id. 
71 See id. at 10–15; Bradley, supra note 29, at 1099 (“[W]hat was essentially a ‘knock and 
talk’ was considered and disapproved of in the often quoted, but no longer fully adhered 
to, 1948 case of Johnson v. United States.”); see, e.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 
(1967) (“[T]he Fourth Amendment protects people, not places.”); Griswold v. Connecti-
cut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965) (“[S]pecific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras, 
formed by emanations from those guarantees that help give them life and substance. Vari-
ous guarantees create zones of privacy.”) (citation omitted). 
72 See 389 U.S. at 347; Amsterdam, supra note 55, at 383. Amsterdam acknowledged the 
“extraordinary character and implications” of Katz when he stated that “[t]he case is, of 
course, now generally recognized as seminal and has rapidly become the basis of a new 
formula of fourth amendment coverage.” See Amsterdam, supra note 55, at 383. 
73 Katz, 389 U.S. at 348, 356–57. 
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agents placed an electronic listening device on the outside of a public 
phone booth to listen to Katz’s conversation within.74 The agents inter-
cepted communications regarding violations of a federal gambling 
statute, evidence that ultimately led to Katz’s conviction.75 
 In overturning his conviction, the Supreme Court began to shift 
away from the common law test in Johnson that relied on physical tres-
pass to determine whether a search occurred.76 The Katz majority held 
that a warrantless, non-physical intrusion of a listening device into a 
public phone booth violates the Fourth Amendment freedom from un-
reasonable searches and seizures.77 Justice Harlan’s concurring opinion 
dictates the modern test, which states that the “understanding of the 
rule that has emerged from prior decisions is that there is a twofold 
requirement, first that a person have exhibited an actual (subjective) 
expectation of privacy and, second, that the expectation be one that 
society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’”78 Thus, the analysis is 
both subjective and objective: did the particular person actually have an 
expectation of privacy, and if so, will society recognize that expectation 
as reasonable?79 
3. The Curtilage Doctrine 
 The Katz mode of analysis continued to gain acceptance as the Su-
preme Court clarified its Fourth Amendment jurisprudence in Oliver v. 
United States.80 Previously, the Court had held that “open fields” — 
property owned by an individual that is not the house—were not pro-
                                                                                                                      
74 Id. at 348. 
75 Id. 
76 See id. at 353, 359; Housholder, supra note 66, at 1281–82 (discussing that courts 
prior to Katz focused on the presence or absence of physical entry onto property to de-
termine Fourth Amendment violations). 
77 See Katz, 389 U.S. at 348–49, 359. The majority also noted that the attempt to narrowly 
tailor the recording to capture only Katz’s conversation did not justify the warrantless search, 
despite the fact that a magistrate would have likely authorized it. Id. at 354, 356. 
78 Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring); see Housholder, supra note 66, at 1283. 
79 See Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring); Robert M. Bloom, Searches, 
Seizures, and Warrants: A Reference Guide to the United States Constitution 46 
(2003) (arguing that “‘reasonable’ has largely come to mean what a majority of Supreme 
Court Justices says is reasonable”); Christopher Slobogin & Joseph E. Schumacher, Reason-
able Expectations of Privacy and Autonomy in Fourth Amendment Cases: An Empirical Look at “Un-
derstandings Recognized and Permitted By Society,” 42 Duke L.J. 727, 731 (1993) (empirically 
analyzing society’s understanding of reasonableness with respect to expectations of pri-
vacy). 
80 466 U.S. at 173. 
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tected by the Fourth Amendment.81 The Court reaffirmed the open 
fields doctrine in Oliver, stating that the “expectation of privacy in open 
fields is not an expectation that ‘society recognizes as reasonable.’”82 
They emphasized the difference between open fields and curtilage, 
which is the “land immediately surrounding and associated with the 
home.”83 People have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the curti-
lage surrounding their dwellings, and therefore, Fourth Amendment 
protection applies.84 
 Knock and talk often requires police officers to walk through the 
curtilage of a dwelling to knock on the door.85 Despite the Fourth 
Amendment protection for curtilage, the Circuit Courts of Appeals 
generally allow police to approach a dwelling, cross through the curti-
lage, and knock on the door without a warrant.86 For example, in Davis 
v. United States, the Ninth Circuit stated: 
Absent express orders from the person in possession against 
any possible trespass, there is no rule of private or public con-
duct which makes it illegal per se, or a condemned invasion of 
the person’s right of privacy, for anyone openly and peaceably, 
at high noon, to walk up the steps and knock on the front 
door of any man’s ‘castle’ with the honest intent of asking 
questions of the occupant thereof—whether the questioner 
be a pollster, a salesman, or an officer of the law.87 
                                                                                                                      
 
81 See Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57, 57, 59 (1924). The Court stated that “[t]he 
distinction between the [open fields] and the house is as old as the common law.” Id. at 59. 
82 Oliver, 466 U.S. at 179. The Court defined the term “open fields” as “any unoccu-
pied or undeveloped area outside of the curtilage.” Id. at 180 n.11. 
83 Id. at 180. 
84 Id. The Supreme Court clarified which portion of the property constitutes curtilage 
for Fourth Amendment purposes in United States v. Dunn, which applied the following four 
factors: the area’s proximity to the home, whether it is included within an enclosure sur-
rounding the home, its nature of use, and the steps taken by the resident to protect the 
area from public observation. See 480 U.S. 294, 301 (1987); see also Bloom, supra note 79, 
at 49 (stating that “[i]n the area just outside the home, called the curtilage, there is at least 
some expectation of privacy and therefore some Fourth Amendment protection”). 
85 See Vanessa Rownaghi, Note, Driving into Unreasonableness: The Driveway, the Curtilage, 
and Reasonable Expectations of Privacy, 11 Am. U. J. Gender Soc. Pol’y & L. 1165, 1166 
(2003) (stating that “[w]idespread acceptance of the ‘knock and talk’ and plain view doc-
trines uniquely impacts a home occupant’s privacy right in the driveway.”); Swingle & Zo-
ellner, supra note 40, at 25. 
86 See Oliver, 466 U.S. at 179; Cephas, 254 F.3d at 493–94; Tobin, 923 F.2d at 1511; Hersh, 
464 F.2d at 230, 232. 
87 327 F.2d 301, 303 (1964); see Cephas, 254 F.3d at 493–94; Tobin, 923 F.2d at 1511; 
Hersh, 464 F.2d at 230. Though Davis came down before Katz, courts have continuously 
upheld as constitutional the act of crossing through curtilage and knocking on a door to 
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 Thus, police may constitutionally approach a house, knock on the 
door, and question the residents inside.88 Nevertheless, this doctrine 
does not grant officers free reign to practice all aspects of policing 
within the curtilage.89 Generally, when police leave a path of access and 
move toward a dwelling’s entrance, some observations into that dwell-
ing may constitute a search.90 The curtilage therefore serves as a buffer 
where a reasonable expectation of privacy exists and police do not have 
free reign to engage in investigatory activities.91 
II. Race, Place, and Income: How Poverty and Race Affect 
Conceptions of Privacy 
 The curtilage doctrine may not be fair to minorities or those living 
in poverty because, though “on the face of it, the criminal law is color-
blind and class-blind . . . , this only makes the problem worse.”92 Race 
and class are important factors in a Fourth Amendment analysis be-
cause courts often note when police officers operate in high-crime 
neighborhoods.93 Officers often use the neighborhood crime level as a 
major justification for reasonable suspicion when making stops or 
                                                                                                                      
question residents. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 347; Davis, 327 F.2d at 301; see, e.g., Cephas, 254 F.3d 
at 493–94 (citing Davis); Tobin, 923 F.2d at 1511 (citing Davis); Hersh, 464 F.2d at 230 (cit-
ing Davis). 
88 See LaFave, supra note 45, at 482–84; Rownaghi, supra note 85, at 1173–74 (“The 
‘knock and talk’ doctrine is founded on the view that it is never objectionable for an offi-
cer to enter private property, which is presumably open to public use.”). 
89 See LaFave, supra note 45, at 485–87. 
90 See Lorenzana v. Superior Court, 511 P.2d 33, 39–41 (Cal. 1973) (holding that ob-
servation into a dwelling was an unlawful search when police crossed a “six-foot-wide strip 
of property immediately adjacent to the window through which the observations were 
made . . .”); Olivera v. State, 315 So.2d 487, 488, 491 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975) (holding 
that observation of bedroom was a search when the police officer “left the sidewalk and 
walked across some grass.”). 
91 See LaFave, supra note 45, at 485–87; Rownaghi, supra note 85, at 1165–66. 
92 David Cole, No Equal Justice: Race and Class in the American Criminal Jus-
tice System 8 (1999). 
93 See, e.g., Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 121 (2000) (mentioning “an area known 
for heavy narcotics trafficking”); see also Andrew Guthrie Ferguson & Damien Bernache, 
The “High Crime Area” Question: Requiring Verifiable and Quantifiable Evidence for Fourth 
Amendment Reasonable Suspicion Analysis, 57 Am. U. L. Rev. 1587, 1589 (2008) (“[T]he Su-
preme Court of the United States has considered the character of the neighborhood to be 
one factor in finding ‘reasonable suspicion’ to stop someone.”) (footnote omitted). Fergu-
son and Bernache argue that courts are inconsistent in defining what a “high crime area” 
is and that most jurisdictions simply rely on an officer’s statement that the area was indeed 
“high crime” without any empirical evidence. See Ferguson & Bernache, supra, at 1607–09. 
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searches.94 In fact, the Supreme Court held that the sole act of running 
away unprovoked from the police in a high crime neighborhood can 
justify a Terry stop.95 
 High crime neighborhoods may be poorer and less able to support 
jobs and infrastructure than the average community.96 They also have a 
greater racial disparity, as “African Americans and Hispanic Americans 
make up almost all of the population in most of the neighborhoods the 
police regard as high crime areas.”97 Officers often refer to the policing 
of high-crime neighborhoods as “Quality of Life Policing.”98 
A. The Low Income, High-Crime Neighborhood:  
Difficulties with the Curtilage Doctrine 
 The curtilage doctrine, as developed in Oliver v. United States and 
United States v. Dunn, is understood differently in the context of urban 
living.99 For example, inner cities—areas that are prone to becoming 
high crime neighborhoods—are often inhabited by poor individuals 
and members of racial minorities.100 Most of these individuals live in 
                                                                                                                      
94 See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30–31 (1968) (holding that a police officer can stop 
and frisk an individual to engage in a limited search for weapons based on reasonable 
suspicion); David A. Harris, Factors for Reasonable Suspicion: When Black and Poor Means 
Stopped and Frisked, 69 Ind. L.J. 659, 660 (1994) (discussing location in a high crime area 
and movement away from police as the two most important factors in justifying a Terry 
stop). After the Terry decision, Amsterdam noted that “[u]nless one takes a very middle-
class white view of life, here is a practice that cries out for some sort of fourth amendment 
regulation.” Amsterdam, supra note 55, at 405 (footnote omitted). 
95 See Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 124–25. The Supreme Court intended Terry to allow a lim-
ited seizure and frisk for weapons “for the protection of [the officer] and others in the 
area . . . in an attempt to discover weapons which might be used to assault him.” See Terry, 
392 U.S. at 30. 
96 See Harris, supra note 94, at 677. 
97 See id. at 677–78. 
98 See Cole, supra note 92, at 44–46; see also David A. Harris, Profiles in Injustice: 
Why Racial Profiling Cannot Work 24–26, 48–49 (2002) (discussing the emergence of 
racial profiling from the “broken windows” theory of quality of life policing). Malcolm 
Gladwell discusses in detail the broken windows theory of crime, which proposes that 
“crime is the inevitable result of disorder.” Malcolm Gladwell, The Tipping Point: How 
Little Things Can Make a Big Difference 141 (2002). “If a window is broken and left 
unrepaired, people walking by will conclude that no one cares and no one is in charge.” 
Id. Gladwell argues that “crime is contagious—just as a fashion trend is contagious—that it 
can start with a broken window and spread to an entire community.” See id. Gladwell dis-
cusses New York City Police Commissioner William J. Bratton’s strategy to “crack down on 
quality-of-life crimes,” stating that “[m]inor, seemingly insignificant quality-of-life crimes 
. . . were Tipping Points for violent crime.” See id. at 146. 
99 See United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 301 (1987); Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 
170, 177–78 (1984); Leonetti, supra note 44, at 311, 318–19. 
100 See Harris, supra note 94, at 677–78. 
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multi-occupant dwellings, where living quarters are shared with other 
individuals or families.101 In addition, buildings are often located close 
to public or other private property, where the curtilage does not ex-
tend.102 
 The curtilage doctrine sometimes affords little protection to 
apartment dwellers because courts are split as to whether one has a rea-
sonable expectation of privacy in an apartment building’s common 
spaces.103 Depending on the jurisdiction, an apartment dweller’s 
Fourth Amendment protection may only extend to the unit’s door and 
not beyond.104 The Supreme Court has recognized that apartment 
dwellers have a reasonable expectation of privacy within their units.105 
A landlord or building owner cannot permit police to search an indi-
vidual unit without the inhabitant’s consent.106 Thus, the curtilage doc-
trine seems to grant little protection to apartment dwellers because 
they cannot exclude others from common spaces outside of the unit.107 
Carrie Leonetti aptly demonstrates the problem: two roommates shar-
ing a unit in an apartment building may exclude each other from their 
respective bedrooms but not from shared common areas.108 The fact 
that the roommates share common areas, however, does not mean that 
a police officer can search the common areas without a warrant.109 
                                                                                                                      
101 See Leonetti, supra note 44, at 310, 318–19. 
102 See LaFave, supra note 45, at 483–87 (discussing the various doctrinal problems of 
multi-unit dwellings and the expectation of privacy entitled therein). 
103 See McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 454 (1948); LaFave, supra note 45, at 
488–89, 492 (“It is not a search for an officer to look into an apartment while in a common 
passageway or other common area of the apartment complex, or to listen from an adjoin-
ing apartment.”); Leonetti, supra note 44, at 317–19. Compare United States v. Nohara, 3 
F.3d 1239, 1240–41 (9th Cir. 1993) (finding no reasonable expectation of privacy in the 
hallway of an apartment building), with United States v. Carriger, 541 F.2d 545, 547 (6th 
Cir. 1976) (finding a reasonable expectation of privacy in the hallway of a locked apart-
ment building). McDonald would probably have a different outcome if the landlady had 
legally admitted police into the common space of the house where the suspects had rented 
a room. See LaFave, supra note 45, at 492. 
104 See Leonetti, supra note 44, at 310; Sean M. Lewis, Note, The Fourth Amendment in the 
Hallway: Do Tenants Have a Constitutionally Protected Privacy Interest in the Locked Common Areas 
of Their Apartment Buildings?, 101 Mich. L. Rev. 273, 274–75, 298–300 (2002) (noting that 
only the Sixth Circuit guarantees a privacy right to a tenant in the locked areas of an 
apartment building that are common to all residents of that building). 
105 See Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301, 303, 313–14 (1958). 
106 See Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483, 489 (1964); Chapman v. United States, 365 
U.S. 610, 610–12, 618 (1961). 
107 See LaFave, supra note 45, at 488–89. 
108 See Leonetti, supra note 44, at 316. 
109 See id. 
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 There are two reasons why knock and talk is easier to implement 
in an apartment complex compared to a single family home.110 First, 
when police are legally in an apartment complex—investigating a dif-
ferent crime, for example—any unit within the building is subject to 
knock and talk.111 Second, a landlord may permit entry into otherwise 
protected common spaces.112 Neither of these circumstances exists for 
single-family homes.113 
B. Power and Pretext: The Legacy of Whren v. United States 
 In Whren v. United States, plainclothes police officers in an un-
marked car were patrolling a “high drug area” of Washington D.C.114 
They noticed a Nissan Pathfinder stopped at a stop sign for more than 
twenty seconds.115 When the officers performed a u-turn and drove 
toward the Pathfinder, the vehicle turned to the right without signaling 
and drove off at an “unreasonable” speed.116 The officers caught up 
with the Pathfinder and one officer approached on foot as it waited at a 
traffic light.117 The officer saw bags in plain view, filled with what he 
believed to be crack cocaine, and arrested the occupants.118 
 On appeal to the Supreme Court, the vehicle occupants argued 
that the police officers stopped them for the pretextual reason of race 
and not for a traffic violation.119 Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice 
Scalia rejected this argument, holding that “[s]ubjective intentions play 
no role in ordinary, probable-cause Fourth Amendment analysis.”120 
The Court also stated that challenges to discriminatory police practices 
must be made using the Equal Protection Clause and not the Fourth 
                                                                                                                      
110 See id. at 310–11, 319–20. 
111 See id. at 314. Such investigations may include the use of a drug sniffing dog near 
an adjacent apartment. See id. 
112 See LaFave, supra note 45, at 778 (“[E]ven where the tenant has exclusive posses-
sion of a certain room or set of rooms, the landlord may nonetheless allow a search of 
other parts of the building, such as a common passageway . . . or a storage area shared by 
the several tenants or by the landlord and tenant.”). 
113 See Kentucky v. King, 131 S. Ct. 1849, 1854 (2011); United States v. Kelly, 551 F.2d 
760, 764 (8th Cir. 1977) (holding that an apartment manager could consent to the search 
of common areas in the apartment building); Lewis, supra note 104, at 298–300 (noting 
that residents of private homes enjoy greater protection than residents of multi-unit 
apartment buildings). 
114 Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 808 (1996). 
115 Id. 
116 Id. 
117 Id. 
118 Id. at 808–09. 
119 See Whren, 517 U.S. at 810–11. 
120 Id. at 813. 
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Amendment.121 Before 1996, Police may have been knocking on the 
door of pretextual policing, but Whren kicked the door wide open.122 
 Whren makes challenges to knock and talk difficult when it is used 
to target low income and minority individuals.123 This is because its leg-
acy has spread beyond the pretextual stop and “deems officers’ motiva-
tions constitutionally irrelevant in search and seizure decisions.”124 
Therefore, implicit targeting of racial minorities and the poor through 
quality of life policing is considered constitutional.125 
 Whren creates difficulty for defendants looking to prove subjective 
discrimination because they must do so under the Equal Protection 
Clause.126 This is a difficult task in light of McCleskey v. Kemp, where the 
Supreme Court rejected a statistically objective Equal Protection chal-
lenge to the death penalty.127 In McCleskey, the Court rejected evidence 
demonstrating that the death penalty is disproportionately applied to 
African American convicts as merely a correlation between punishment 
and race.128 Thus, “only evidence of racial animus of the most direct 
nature in the defendant’s own case could prove an equal protection 
violation . . . .”129 Therefore, absent a direct admission of racial bias, 
Whren and McCleskey foreclose proof of an officer’s racial animus.130 
                                                                                                                      
121 See id. 
122 See id.; see also Sheri Lynn Johnson, Race and the Decision to Detain a Suspect, 93 Yale 
L.J. 214, 225–30 (1983) (discussing the police’s use of race in determining probable cause 
or reasonable suspicion). 
123 See Whren, 517 U.S. at 813; David A. Harris, “Driving While Black” and All Other Traffic 
Offenses: The Supreme Court and Pretextual Traffic Stops, 87 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 544, 
553–54 (1997); Harris, supra note 94, at 677–78. 
124 See Wayne A. Logan, Street Legal: The Court Affords Police Constitutional Carte Blanche, 
77 Ind. L.J. 419, 465 (2002). 
125 See Whren, 517 U.S. at 813; Cole, supra note 92, at 40 (the Whren standard “frees a 
police officer to target members of minority groups for selective enforcement”) (quoting 
United States v. Dotero-Ospina, 71 F.3d 783, 790 (10th Cir. 1995) (en banc) (Seymour, J., 
dissenting)); Harris, supra note 94, at 677–78. Professor David Cole also notes that “‘con-
sent’ searches, pretextual traffic stops, and ‘quality of life’ policing are all disproportion-
ately used against black citizens.” Cole, supra note 92, at 8; see also Peter A. Lyle, Note, 
Racial Profiling and the Fourth Amendment: Applying the Minority Victim Perspective to Ensure 
Equal Protection Under the Law, 21 B.C. Third World L.J. 243, 247 (2001) (discussing 
courts’ unresponsiveness to the concerns of African-Americans during searches and sei-
zures by police, particularly allegations of discriminatory intent behind racial profiling 
techniques). 
126 See Whren, 517 U.S. at 813; Harris, supra note 123, at 677–78. 
127 See 481 U.S. 279, 319 (1987). 
128 See id. at 286–87, 312. 
129 See Harris, supra note 123, at 552. 
130 See Whren, 517 U.S. at 813; Harris, supra note 123, at 550, 552. 
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III. Knock and Talk and the Diminishment of Privacy 
 The standard for waiver of citizens’ rights to be “secure in their . . . 
houses . . . against unreasonable searches and seizures” is lower than 
that for waiver of other constitutionally protected rights.131 Courts 
maintain a low threshold for what constitutes voluntary consent to a 
search regardless of compelling circumstances, and instead look to po-
lice misconduct to determine voluntariness.132 Even though the Su-
preme Court recognized the inherent coercive nature of custodial 
questioning and instituted the Miranda warning, no such warning is 
required in knock and talk practice.133 Instead, officers may conduct a 
knock and talk and even enter the dwelling without a warrant if exigent 
circumstances—like the impending destruction of evidence—exist.134 
The very fact, however, that the police are at the front door will, in 
some situations, create the destruction of evidence exigency that allows 
the officers to enter.135 Furthermore, the Supreme Court held in Ken-
tucky v. King that police are incapable of creating exigent circumstances 
when engaging in legal police activity.136 
A. Knock and Talk and the Consent Search 
 Law enforcement officers prefer to receive consent to search be-
cause “[i]t is certainly easier to obtain consent from an intimidated, 
ignorant citizen than to obtain the requisite level of individualized sus-
picion necessary to justify a search.”137 Once consent is granted, police 
can legally search without a warrant, reasonable suspicion, or probable 
cause.138 This Fourth Amendment right, however, is not always waived 
when an individual consents to a search.139 
                                                                                                                      
131 See U.S. Const. amend. IV; Lassiter, supra note 41, at 1174–77. 
132 See Strauss, supra note 36, at 222–25. 
133 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 468–69 (1966); Bradley, supra note 29, at 1127. 
134 See Sonntag, supra note 38, at 629. 
135 See Bradley, supra note 29, at 1099 (“Under ‘knock and talk,’ police go to people’s 
residences, with or without probable cause, and knock on the door to obtain plain views of 
the interior of the house, to question the residents, to seek consent to search, and/or to 
arrest without a warrant, often based on what they discover during the ‘knock and talk.’”). 
136 See Kentucky v. King, 131 S. Ct. 1849, 1862 (2011). 
137 See Lassiter, supra note 41, at 1172. 
138 See Bloom, supra note 79, at 113; LaFave, supra note 45, at 596, 599. 
139 See Daniel L. Rotenberg, An Essay on Consent(less) Police Searches, 69 Wash. U.L.Q. 
175, 176 (1991). 
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 Normally, the standard for waiver of a constitutionally protected 
right is very high.140 The Supreme Court set the standard in Johnson v. 
Zerbst, defining waiver as “ordinarily an intentional relinquishment or 
abandonment of a known right or privilege.”141 In the seminal case of 
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, however, this standard changed for consent 
searches.142 In Schneckloth, the police asked to search a vehicle, received 
consent, and discovered evidence used to convict the defendants.143 
The district court denied a writ of habeas corpus, but the Ninth Circuit 
Court of Appeals reversed, requiring proof of (1) uncoerced consent, 
and (2) that the respondent knew consent could be “freely and effec-
tively withheld.”144 The Supreme Court, however, reversed, stating that 
“the Court has assessed the totality of all the surrounding circum-
stances—both the characteristics of the accused and the details of the 
interrogation.”145 
 Therefore, an individual’s knowledge of the right to withhold con-
sent is not dispositive of the voluntariness of the consent granted.146 
Officers need not inform individuals of their right to refuse consent 
because it is impractical and hampers the effectiveness of investiga-
tions.147 Thus, the Supreme Court distinguished waiver of a Fourth 
Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures 
from other rights afforded to defendants in criminal actions because of 
“the context of the safeguards of a fair criminal trial.”148 
                                                                                                                      
140 See id. at 1174–75 (comparing the higher standard for waiver with the lower stan-
dard for voluntariness). 
141 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938). This case, however, dealt with the question of waiver of a 
Sixth Amendment right. Id. at 459. 
142 See 412 U.S. 218, 227–33 (1973); see also LaFave, supra note 45, at 608 (stating that 
Schneckloth is “the Supreme Court’s most detailed examination of the theoretical basis of 
the consent search concept . . .”). 
143 See Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 220–21. The California Court of Appeals for the First 
Appellate District affirmed the conviction and the Supreme Court of California denied 
review. See id. Even though the Court acknowledged the special protection of the home 
given by the Fourth Amendment, the Schneckloth doctrine allows for searches of the home 
with the same ease as for vehicles and other locations. See Bradley, supra note 29, at 1112–
13 (“The lower courts have generally approved the practice of avoiding warrant and/or 
probable cause requirements through ‘knock and talk’ consents.”). 
144 Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 221–22. 
145 Id. at 226. Some of the other factors that the Court cited were “youth of the ac-
cused, his lack of education, or his low intelligence, the lack of any advice to the accused 
of his constitutional rights, the length of detention, the repeated and prolonged nature of 
the questioning, and the use of physical punishment such as the deprivation of food or 
sleep.” Id. (citations omitted). 
146 See id. at 227. 
147 See id. at 231–32. 
148 Id. at 235. 
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B. Criticism of the Schneckloth Doctrine: Lower Standards for Higher Stakes 
 Scholars have criticized the Schneckloth doctrine for two reasons.149 
First, the standard of waiver—not requiring informed consent—is 
lower for searches and seizures than for other constitutionally-
protected rights.150 Second, the courts have rarely engaged in detailed 
analysis as to whether the government met its burden to prove the low-
ered standard of waiver.151 
1. A Lower Standard of Waiver 
 Scholars question why the right “against unreasonable searches 
and seizures” has a lower standard of waiver than other constitutionally-
protected rights, like the right to a jury trial or the privilege against self-
incrimination.152 The higher standard applies when the accused al-
ready has an attorney’s advice, but the lower standard is used when 
consenting to searches without any legal guidance.153 Thus, the lower 
standard allows individuals to unwittingly or unknowingly waive their 
Fourth Amendment rights.154 
State.155 Few legitimate reasons exist for a person engaged in illegal 
 Citizens will often waive their Fourth Amendment rights when 
confronted by an armed and authoritative representative of the 
                                                                                                                      
149 See, e.g., Michael J. Friedman, Another Stab at Schneckloth: The Problem of Limited Con-
sent Searches and Plain View Searches, 89 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 313, 346 (1998) (“The 
current law of limited consent searches and plain view seizures combines to create a wide 
avenue for police to gain entry by substituting deceit for probable cause.”); Lassiter, supra 
note 41, at 1180 (“Since Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, issues of racial profiling, recognition of 
inherent power imbalance, and concerns about erosion of Fourth Amendment protections 
have fueled a continuing analysis in evaluating the police-citizen confrontations.”); Strauss, 
supra note 36, at 235 (“In sum, the voluntariness standard in Schneckloth has led to confu-
sion at best and inadequate protection for suspects’ Fourth Amendment rights at worst. It 
is p ed in Schneckloth are 
ofte
amend. IV; see Lassiter, supra note 41, at 1174–77 (explaining the rea-
sons
efendant could 
not en pleading nolo contendere); United States v. 
Jere
 
oorly understood, and in practice, the subjective factors emphasiz
n ignored or minimized.”). 
150 See U.S. Const. amend. IV; Lassiter, supra note 41, at 1174–77. 
151 See Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 230; Strauss, supra note 36, at 221–22. 
152 U.S. Const. 
 for a higher standard for rights necessary to guarantee a fair trial, but criticizing the 
test for consent). 
153 See Halbert v. Michigan, 545 U.S. 605, 609–10 (2005) (holding that d
waive his right to counsel for appeal wh
z, 108 F.3d 684, 686–88 (7th Cir. 1997); Lassiter, supra note 41, at 1175. 
154 See Lassiter, supra note 41, at 1175. 
155 See id. at 1175–77, 1189. Christo Lassiter cited State v. Brown, a Supreme Court of 
Arkansas case in which the court stated that “[i]t is the intimidation effect of multiple po-
lice officers appearing at a home dweller’s doorstep, sometimes in uniform and armed, 
and requesting consent to search without advising the home dweller of his or her right to 
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activity to consent to being searched.156 Even innocent suspects have 
little reason to consent, aside from demonstrating that they have noth-
ing to hide, especially in inner cities where residents may take a nega-
tive view toward the police.157 
2. Lack of Consent and Police Misconduct 
ses of whether the govern- Courts rarely engage in detailed analy
ment meets its burden to prove a suspect’s consent.158 In a three-year 
study of courts deciding consent issues, there were “only a handful of 
cases—out of hundreds of decisions—in which the court analyzed the 
suspect’s particular subjective factors.”159 An even smaller fraction of the 
cases found that the suspect did not consent.160 Courts have found vol-
untary consent even in cases where the subjective factors would seem 
compelling, like low I.Q. or poor command of the English language.161 
                                                                                                                      
refuse consent that presents the constitutional problem.” Id. at 1189 (quoting State v. 
—while blocking the aisle 
that
156
 sense of informal de facto plea bargaining with 
consent to a search, they have “so much to lose 
per
 
urb  and suspicion.”). 
supra note 36, at 221–22. 
uss, supra note 36, at 222. 
 
Brown, 156 S.W.3d 722, 726 (Ark. 2004)). Justice Marshall expressed concerns about this 
inherently coercive interaction in his dissenting opinion in Florida v. Bostick. See 501 U.S. 
429,446 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting). In his dissent, Justice Marshall quoted a Florida 
court, that held “[t]he spectre of American citizens being asked, by badge-wielding police, 
for identification, travel papers—in short a raison d’etre—is foreign to any fair reading of 
the Constitution, and its guarantee of human liberties.” Id. at 443 (quoting Bostick v. State, 
554 So. 2d 1153, 1158 (Fla. 1989) (quoting State v. Kerwick, 512 So. 2d 347, 348–49 (Fla. 
App. 1987) (quoting trial court order))). Bostick involved a suspicionless consent search on 
an interstate bus, where the officers wore bright green “raid” jackets and visibly displayed 
their badges—one officer even held a gun in a weapons pouch
 would have allowed Bostick to exit the bus. Id. at 444, 446. 
 See Lassiter, supra note 41, at 1177. Lassiter suggests some plausible reasons: 
(1) a desire to be exposed as a first step toward forgiveness and rehabilitation; 
(2) a desire to expose the wrongdoings of associates, relatives, and others in 
shared spaces; (3) a desire to avoid further suspicion and delay; and (4) per-
haps, at some level, a forlorn
the law enforcement officer. 
Id.; see also Cole, supra note 92, at 19 (stating in its discussion of Bostick that “no ‘reason-
able person’ would agree to a search of a bag that contained a pound of cocaine if he 
really believed he was free to say no without adverse consequences”); Strauss, supra note 
36, at 239 (stating that when individuals 
sonally by conceding to the officer.”). 
157 See David T. McTaggart, Reciprocity on the Streets: Reflections on the Fourth Amendment 
and the Duty to Cooperate with the Police, 76 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1233, 1234 (2001) (“Widespread 
abuse of police discretion has polarized the relationship between police and residents of
an communities, leaving each entity to regard the other with distrust
158 See Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 230; Strauss, 
159 See Stra
160 See id. 
161 See id. at 222–24. Strauss discussed United States v. Hall, where the suspect’s I.Q. of 76 
and psychological problems did not invalidate his ability to consent. See 969 F.2d 1102, 
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In the few cases where consent was not voluntary, courts eschewed sub-
jective knowledge and focused instead on police misconduct.162 
C. Two Fourth Amendments: Coercion versus Confidence 
 The Schneckloth consent doctrine instituted a system where police 
may exploit a citizen’s ignorance of constitutional rights.163 This “cre-
ates two Fourth Amendments—one for people who are aware of their 
right to say no and confident enough to assert that right against a po-
lice officer, and another for those who do not know their rights or are 
afraid to assert them.”164 Even after consent is refused, police officers 
may be able to convince suspects to change their minds.165 
 There are two diverging perspectives regarding the nature of con-
sent to search: some see the request as an honest appeal but others re-
gard it as a demand where choice is illusory.166 The Supreme Court re-
gards an officer and suspect’s interaction on equal terms: if the 
individual wishes to terminate the encounter, then the officer will 
oblige.167 Individuals met with requests for a search, however, often re-
gard them as commands, where the individual’s ability to terminate the 
                                                                                                                      
1102, 1108 (D.C. Cir. 1992); Strauss, supra note 36, at 222–24. She also discussed Semelis v. 
State, where the suspect’s illiteracy and serious problems understanding English were not 
suff
des “threats to the suspect 
or h
ounters lest they spiral out of control. Still, 
the ing consent is the cocksureness in asking for consent 
whe
ll and may go on his way”), with Strauss, supra note 36, at 240–
41 (
S. at 232 (“It is an act of respon-
sible
icient to overturn a finding of voluntary consent. See 493 S.E.2d 17, 20 (Ga. Ct. App. 
1997); Strauss, supra note 36, at 222 n.37. 
162 See Strauss, supra note 36, at 225. Police misconduct inclu
is family, deprivation of necessities until the suspect consents, asserting an absolute 
right to search, and an unusual and extreme show of force.” Id. 
163 See Lassiter, supra note 41, at 1177–80. Lassiter notes that “[p]olice officers are 
trained to exude confidence and command enc
most important factor in gain
n no other option is apparent.” Id. at 1177. 
164 Cole, supra note 92, at 31. 
165 See Bradley, supra note 29, at 1112 (“Even if police are initially refused consent, they 
can often cajole the homeowner into giving it.”). 
166 Compare Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 497–98 (1983) (holding that a “person ap-
proached [by police] . . . need not answer any question put to him; indeed, he may decline 
to listen to the questions at a
noting that most people interpret requests as demands, particularly when requests are 
made by authority figures). 
167 See Housholder, supra note 66, at 1303–04 (discussing validation of the consent 
search as being grounded in notions of autonomy of the individual, and “even an ill-
advised or foolish decision would have to be honored, in order to fully respect the individ-
ual.”); see, e.g., Royer, 460 U.S. at 497–98; Schneckloth 412 U.
 citizenship for individuals to give whatever information they may have to aid in law 
enforcement.”) (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 477–78). 
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encounter is purely illusory.168 Courts have expressed a hesitance to rec-
ognize an encounter’s inherently coercive nature even in knock and talk 
stain nces in constitutionally protected dwellings.169 
 For many individuals, the mere presence of an armed and uni-
formed police officer at their doorstep is coercive, particularly because 
many do not know the constitutional limits of law enforcement.170 Stud-
ies show that “man’s innate tendency to obey authority can impair his 
decision making and, ultimately, dull the understanding with which he 
exercises his constitutional rights.”171 For example, Stanley Milgram’s 
Behavioral Study of Obedience demonstrated the willingness of individuals 
to obey instructions inconsistent with their own moral beliefs simply 
because they came, without physical threat, from an authority figure.172 
Thus, requests to search homes are likely coercive because police offi-
cers have authority and, perhaps unintentionally, implicitly display 
means to enforce that authority.173 Psychological findings like Mil-
gram’s “cast[] serious doubt [on the Supreme Court’s stance] . . . that 
                                                                                                                      
168 See Strauss, supra note 36, at 240–41. For example, Strauss states that “if a police of-
ficer came up to a person about to park his car and said, ‘Would you mind moving your 
car?’, most persons would do so, believing that they had to move their car.” See id. at 241; see 
also Tracey Maclin, “Black and Blue Encounters” —Some Preliminary Thoughts About Fourth 
Ame
 the door when an in-
hab
, Tracey Maclin notes that “[a]n understandable and 
rati ck men to decline to cooperate and to question the 
offi
 . make challenging an officer’s authority out of the 
que
ndment Seizures: Should Race Matter?, 26 Val. U. L. Rev. 243, 249–50 (1991) (“Common 
sense teaches that most of us do not have the chutzpuh or stupidity to tell a police officer 
to ‘get lost’ after he has stopped us and asked for identification or questioned us about 
possible criminal conduct.”). 
169 See United States v. Dickerson, 975 F.2d 1245, 1247, 1249 (7th Cir. 1992) (holding 
that consent to search home was voluntary when four police officers knocked loudly on its 
front door with their guns drawn and one officer stuck his foot in
itant of the dwelling opened it slightly); Adrian J. Barrio, Rethinking Schneckloth v. 
Bustamonte: Incorporating Obedience Theory into the Supreme Court’s Conception of Voluntary 
Consent, 1997 U. Ill. L. Rev. 215, 228 (discussing the presumption that non-custody of a 
suspect implies lack of coercion to necessitate a Miranda warning). 
170 See Cole, supra note 92, at 34; Lassiter, supra note 41, at 1189–91. Cole also ques-
tions whether the ability to say no to a police request for consent is a choice at all for Afri-
can-Americans and Hispanics, where fear of violent retaliation is a real concern. See Cole, 
supra note 92, at 33–34. In light of this
onal response . . . would be for bla
cer’s right to conduct [a] stop.” Maclin, supra note 168, at 261–62. He recognizes, how-
ever, that “[t]he realities of the street . .
stion for a black man.” Id. at 262. 
171 Barrio, supra note 169, at 233. 
172 See id. at 237. See generally Stanley Milgram, Behavioral Study of Obedience, 67 J. Ab-
normal & Soc. Psychol. 371 (1963). 
173 See Barrio, supra note 166, at 241–42. 
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cu dy is a necessary prerequisite for a finding of psychological coer-
cion.”
sto
is design is intentional, argues Pro-
fessor Tracey Maclin, because the Schneckloth Court was determined 
“not to 
                                                                                                                     
174 
 The Supreme Court created a Constitutional safeguard in Miranda 
v. Arizona by requiring warnings to dispel any coercion of those in cus-
tody.175 Police, however, need not give any similar warning to an indi-
vidual during knock and talk.176 Th
create another Miranda.”177 
D. Knock and Talk and the Creation of Exigent Circumstances 
 The Supreme Court has permitted multiple exceptions—based on 
exigent circumstances—to the Fourth Amendment’s command that “no 
warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause.”178 One such exigent cir-
cumstance is the destruction of evidence, where police officers can en-
ter private residences to seize evidence that they believe is being de-
stroyed.179 Police must have probable cause of a crime before entering 
 
a note 36, at 239 (noting that the Milgram study does 
not ent searches, but points out that “people follow 
or o
do so, there is likely harm.”). 
arch based on exigent circumstances. See Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 
42, 
174 Id. at 240; see also Strauss, supr
analogize perfectly to the issue of cons
bey a ‘request’ made by police officers in authority positions in situations where there 
is not only no ostensible benefit to 
175 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 468–69. 
176 See Bradley, supra note 29, at 1127. 
177 Tracey Maclin, The Good and Bad News About Consent Searches in the Supreme Court, 39 
McGeorge L. Rev. 27, 54 (2008). 
178 U.S. Const. amend. IV; see Sonntag, supra note 38, at 629–30. 
179 See Sonntag, supra note 38, at 629. Other exigent circumstances that allow for a 
warrantless entry include hot pursuit of a fleeing suspect and protection of the public or 
police. See John Mark Huff, Warrantless Entries and Searches Under Exigent Circumstances: Why 
Are They Justified and What Types of Circumstances Are Considered Exigent?, 87 U. Det. Mercy 
L. Rev. 373 (2010). In addition, the Court sanctioned the “search incident to arrest” doc-
trine, allowing for an officer to conduct a limited search for weapons upon arrest of a sus-
pect to protect himself and the public. See Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762–63 
(1969). This search is limited only to the area within the suspect’s immediate control and 
cannot extend further than “the area from within which [the suspect] might gain posses-
sion of a weapon . . . .” Id. Also, the Supreme Court has sanctioned warrantless searches of 
automobiles upon probable cause since the 1920s. See Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 
132, 153 (1925) (recognizing “a necessary difference between a search of a . . . dwelling 
house . . . and a search of a[n] . . . automobile, for contraband goods, where it is not prac-
ticable to secure a warrant, because the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or 
jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought”). This so-called automobile exception is, 
at its heart, a se
51 (1970) (“Carroll . . . holds a search warrant unnecessary where there is probable 
cause to search an automobile stopped on the highway; the car is movable, the occupants 
are alerted, and the car’s contents may never be found again if a warrant must be ob-
tained.”). 
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to stop the destruction of evidence.180 In knock and talk situations, how-
ever, officers often obtain probable cause only after crossing through 
curtilage or approaching the front door.181 Even if police already have 
probable cause, they may choose to approach the door of a dwelling 
without a warrant and try knock and talk.182 The officer’s act of knock-
ing on the door, however, sometimes forces suspects to destroy evidence 
 that the suspect’s blood alcohol content would dissi-
                                                                                                                     
that would otherwise be preserved, and thereby creates the very exi-
gency that allows them to enter.183 
 The destruction of evidence exigency doctrine has its roots in 
Schmerber v. California.184 In Schmerber, police detained the suspect at a 
hospital after a car accident for drunken driving.185 Despite the sus-
pect’s refusal, police instructed hospital workers to withdraw blood to 
test for intoxication.186 The Court upheld the search into the suspect’s 
body as lawful, stating that “[t]he officer in the present case . . . might 
reasonably have believed that he was confronted with an emergency, in 
which the delay necessary to obtain a warrant, under the circum-
stances, threatened the ‘destruction of evidence.’”187 The Supreme 
Court reasoned
 
 specifically estab-
lish
10th Cir. 1996), by stating that “police officers responding to a call 
abo
emical smell, together with a man whose hands are stained with red phosphorous 
and ho tries to slam the door in their faces, may pursue the 
man  
lken, supra note 39, at 293 (“[D]oes the word ‘incident’ suggest that 
the 
180 See Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30, 34 (1970) (“[O]nly in ‘a few
ed and well-delineated’ situations may a warrantless search of a dwelling withstand 
constitutional scrutiny, even though the authorities have probable cause to conduct it.”) 
(citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. at 357). 
181 See King, 131 S. Ct. at 1854; Bradley, supra note 29, at 1099, 1104. 
182 See Bradley, supra note 29, at 1099 (“Under ‘knock and talk,’ police go to people’s 
residences, with or without probable cause, and knock on the door to obtain plain views of 
the interior of the house, to question the residents, to seek consent to search, and/or to 
arrest without a warrant, often based on what they discover during the ‘knock and talk.’”). 
183 See id.; Swingle & Zoellner, supra note 40, at 28 (describing the facts of United States 
v. Scroger, 98 F.3d 1256 (
ut a suspected methamphetamine laboratory who are met at the door by an overpower-
ing ch
 who is carrying a hot plate, w
 into the house”).
184 See Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 770–71 (1966); Sonntag, supra note 38, at 
632. 
185 Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 758. 
186 Id. at 758–59. 
187 Id. at 770 (quoting Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364, 367 (1964)). Critics de-
rided the Schmerber opinion for its lack of clarity on the underlying constitutional basis for 
the search, as the search could have been incident to arrest or necessitated by exigent 
circumstances. See Sa
search was justified under the more traditional search-incident-to-arrest exception 
. . . ?”); Sonntag, supra note 38, at 633 (“[W]hether it was destruction of evidence, search 
incident to arrest, or a combination of the two that justified the warrantless search is not 
readily apparent.”). 
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p  while authorities got a warrant, thus destroying the evidence of 
intoxication.
ate
lous standard permits police 
to enter virtually any dwelling with only a minimal or non-existent 
threat t
s 
     
188 
 The Supreme Court declined to clarify the destruction of evidence 
exigency standard when it again arose in Vale v. Louisiana.189 In Vale, the 
Court held the destruction of evidence exigency not available when, 
upon entering the dwelling, officers found nobody within to destroy 
the evidence.190 The Court did not object to the initial entry into the 
dwelling, even though the search for evidence within the dwelling was 
illegal.191 Taken to its extreme, Vale’s nebu
hat evidence may be destroyed.192 
E. Kentucky v. King and its Effect on Exigent Circumstances 
 In King, the Supreme Court decided the extent of the destruction 
of evidence exigency requirement and resolved a circuit split over when 
police impermissibly create exigent circumstances.193 The Court, assum-
ing the existence of exigent circumstances, held that the Fourth 
Amendment is not violated when officers “do not gain entry to premise
by means of an actual or threatened violation . . . .”194 This, in turn, re-
duces the protection of individuals from warrantless policing tactics.195 
                                                                                                                 
188 See Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 770–71. The court also noted that this search involved an 
intrusion into the body, and distinguished the inquiry from the law of search and seizure 
in th t 767–68. Nevertheless, the Court cited to Schmerber in cases 
invo
nan, J., dis-
sent
ed destruction of evidence justifies a 
war
 ini-
tial ustified in the circumstances.”). 
o may destroy evidence). 
e property context. See id. a
lving intrusions into non-bodily property. See, e.g., Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 
742–43, 750 (1984); Vasquez v. United States, 454 U.S. 975, 988 (1981) (Bren
ing). 
189 See Vale, 399 U.S. at 35; Salken, supra note 39, at 297 (“Vale can be cited in virtually 
every case in which one wishes to argue that threaten
rantless entry, and its ambiguities frequently allow it to be cited by both sides.”). 
190 See Vale, 399 U.S. at 34. 
191 See id.; Salken, supra note 39, at 295 (“[T]he Court may have tacitly viewed the
entry and limited search as j
192 See Salken, supra note 39, at 295–97 (stating that mere arrest of a suspect outside of 
a dwelling may be enough to fulfill the Vale standard and permit officers to search the 
dwelling for those inside wh
193 King, 131 S. Ct. at 1862; see United States v. Coles, 437 F.3d 361, 370 (3rd Cir. 2006); 
United States v. Gould, 364 F.3d 578, 590 (5th Cir. 2004); United States v. Duchi, 906 F.2d 
1278, 1284 (8th Cir. 1990); United States v. Webster, 750 F.2d 307, 327 (5th Cir. 1984). 
194 King, 131 S. Ct. at 1862. 
195 See id.; Salken, supra note 39, at 288 (arguing that, without guidance from the Su-
preme Court, circuit courts have been too expansive in their interpretation of the exigent 
circumstances exception). 
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 Each of the split circuits’ proposed tests creates difficulties.196 For 
example, the Eighth Circuit takes the position that police tend to cre-
ate exigent circumstances with any action they take.197 Therefore, the 
se u of knock and talk is a means of seeking information or consent to 
search, and destruction of evidence is not a foreseeable result.198 
 Courts are also likely to rely on the officer’s judgment in determin-
ing whether the sounds heard from within the apartment were indeed 
the destruction of evidence.199 For example, the trial court in King per-
mitted a warrantless entry into an apartment because the officers be-
lieved that “evidence was possibly being destroyed based on the sound 
                                                                                                                      
196 See Salken, supra note 39, at 324 (noting that, in discussing the importance of indi-
vidual constitutional rights, “[m]ost of the circuits do not encourage police officers to seek 
 MacDonald, 916 F.2d at 772. Bryan Abramoske notes that the Court in 
Mac inition of lawfulness. See Abramoske, supra note 31, at 
576
icult . . . for courts to precisely determine 
what ition, 
“[b]y  why 
they u
condu , Co-
lumbi
bravado, the cop on the stand may 
H. R Zeal: A Columbia Law Professor’s Year on the Streets 
wit
warrants whenever possible”). The Second Circuit is the most deferential of the circuit 
courts in determining whether police can enter a dwelling based on destruction of evi-
dence exigent circumstances. See King v. Commonwealth, 302 S.W.3d 649, 656 (Ky. 2010); 
United States v. MacDonald, 916 F.2d 766, 772 (2nd Cir. 1990) (“[T]he fact that the agent 
may be ‘interested’ in having the occupants react in a way that provides exigent circum-
stances and may ‘fully expect[]’ such a reaction does not invalidate action that is otherwise 
lawful.”) (quoting Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 129 (1990)). As long as the police 
officers act in a lawful manner, they are incapable of impermissibly creating exigent cir-
cumstances. See
Donald does not provide a def
. The Third, Fifth, and Eighth circuits have held that an officer’s bad faith is not always 
required to impermissibly create exigent circumstances, looking in part to the reasonable-
ness of the officer’s actions. See Coles, 437 F.3d at 370; Gould, 364 F.3d at 590; Duchi, 906 
F.2d at 1284. 
197 See Duchi, 906 F.2d at 1284. 
198 See Abramoske, supra note 31, at 579–80 (suggesting that courts should apply an ob-
jective test to determine whether police officers intentionally created exigent circum-
stances). Abramoske notes that “[i]t is often diff
an officer intended to accomplish during an investigation.” Id. at 579. In add
the time a case reaches the court, police officers can think of justifications for
sed an investigative tactic, even if those reasons did not actually factor into their 
ct.” Id. After spending a year in the company of New York City police officers
a Law Professor H. Richard Uviller noted: 
When cops lie, however, detection is apt to be difficult. In many cases, the cop 
steps up to the plate as the heavy hitter, badge shining, tone official, de-
meanor cool. Without apparent strain or 
appear as a modest hero, a competent collector of evidence, a precise narra-
tor of the critical events. The incidents the cop relates are usually known only 
o one or ghtt  two other cops, who mi  coordinate their recollections. Even 
when possible to procure, contradiction of the cop’s version from other wit-
nesses is often weak and flawed by bias. 
ichard Uviller, Tempered 
h the New York City Police 112 (1988). 
199 See King, 131 S. Ct. at 1862; Salken, supra note 39, at 288 (outlining the three differ-
ent approaches that courts use, all of which involve crediting police testimony to some 
extent). 
2012] Issues of Place and Race in “Knock and Talk” Policing 145 
of movement inside the apartment.”200 That standard could allow police 
to enter a dwelling on almost any sound of movement or even a toilet 
 allow a search.204 In King, 
entered the dwelling.208 Officers 
                                                                                                                     
flush.201 Justice Sotomayor expressed this concern during King’s oral 
argument, stating that “any police officer will come in and say: In my 
experience, most drug dealers destroy the evidence when we knock.”202 
 The Supreme Court resolved the circuit split by stating that police 
cannot impermissibly create exigent circumstances unless they attempt 
to “gain entry to premises by means of an actual or threatened violation 
of the Fourth Amendment.”203 In the closest the Court has come to 
directly discussing knock and talk, it noted that the inhabitants need 
not come to the door, speak with officers, or
however, the Supreme Court held that no actual or threatened viola-
tion of the Fourth Amendment occurred, despite the officers’ threat to 
make a forced entry into the apartment.205 
 While the Court emphasized that they assumed exigency for the 
sake of argument, the King decision creates more difficulty for suspects 
looking to cast doubt upon claims of exigent circumstances.206 Police 
testimony is often very persuasive at trial and there is frequently little 
opportunity or ability to impeach an officer on the stand.207 Thus, ju-
ries or judges are likely to defer to an officer’s judgment that exigent 
circumstances existed when he or she 
 
200 King, 302 S.W.3d at 652. 
tandard called the ‘probable cause-probable cause’ rule.” 
Son
 believe that a crime is being committed within a dwelling, but in addition, prob-
able nce is actually being destroyed before engaging in a war-
rant
 v. King, 131 S. Ct. 61 (2010) (No. 09–
127
/justice-in-dreamland/ (examining 
the Linda Greenhouse discusses the disconnect be-
twee
viller, supra note 198, at 112. 
 
201 See Salken, supra note 39, at 326 (“[C]ourts may find that destruction of evidence in 
narcotics cases is so prevalent that warrantless searches will be permitted whenever there is 
probable cause to believe narcotics are present.”). Geoffrey Sonntag argues that the Su-
preme “Court should adopt a s
ntag, supra note 38, at 651. This rule would require that police not only have probable 
cause to
 cause to believe that evide
less entry. See id. at 651–52. 
202 Transcript of Oral Argument at 13, Kentucky
2). 
203 King, 131 S. Ct. at 1862. 
204 See id. The Supreme Court, like the Kentucky Supreme Court, assumed for the sake 
of argument than an actual exigency existed. See id. 
205 Id. at 1854, 1862. 
206 See id. at 1862; Linda Greenhouse, Justice in Dreamland, N.Y. Times (May 18, 2011, 9:42 
PM), http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/05/18
exigent circumstances analysis in King). 
n how the Supreme Court views citizen-police interactions and how citizens themselves 
view them, stating “I don’t know about other people, but I have never found an uninvited 
encounter with the police to be a source of comfort.” Id. 
207 See U
208 See King, 131 S. Ct. at 1865 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“How ‘secure’ do our homes 
remain if police, armed with no warrant, can pound on doors at will and, on hearing 
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may al  own 
judgment to determ ances exist, thereby 
have within their dwellings.213 The warrant requirement is important in 
policing the boundaries between law enforcement and the constitu-
                                                     
so take advantage of this deference and rely more on their
ine whether exigent circumst
circumventing the warrant process.209 
IV. Storming the Castle: Knocking Down the Fourth 
Amendment in Inner Cities 
 The Supreme Court seems unlikely to consider the realities and 
effects of knock and talk, regardless of whether its application is in a 
discriminatory manner.210 Simply because a particular policing tech-
nique is considered constitutional, however, does not necessarily mean 
it should be used.211 Knock and talk reduces the level of trust between 
citizens of the inner cities and the police that are supposed to protect 
them.212 It diminishes the sense of safety and security that those citizens 
                                                                 
sou
Supreme Court] noted, the police had quietly gone to a magistrate and obtained a 
sear
 warning). See generally Kentucky v. 
Kin
e Cole, supra note 92, at 53 (arguing that the “Court’s removal of meaningful 
Fou
m a police officer and, when the officer’s flashlight 
blin
nds indicative of things moving, forcibly enter and search for evidence of unlawful 
activity?”). 
209 See Greenhouse, supra note 206 (“If instead of pounding on the door, the [Ken-
tucky 
ch warrant, the people in the apartment would have had no reason to start scurrying 
around destroying their valuable contraband.”). 
210 See Maclin, supra note 177, at 54 (arguing that the Court in Schneckloth v. Bustamonte 
was attempting to avoid the creation of another Miranda
g, 131 S. Ct. 1849 (2011) (omitting mention of the phrase “knock and talk” in its opin-
ion). 
211 Se
rth Amendment review allows the police to rely on unparticularized discretion, unsub-
stantiated hunches, and nonindividualized suspicion. Racial prejudice and stereotypes 
linking racial minorities to crime rush to fill the void”). 
212 See id. at 46 (discussing indiscriminate police stops and the hostility and mistrust 
that it fosters towards police); Bradley, supra note 29, at 1104–05; Maclin, supra note 168, at 
255–57. 
213 See Henry Pierson Curtis, Cops ‘Knock and Talk’ Tactic Draws Flak After Near-Fatal 
Shooting, Orlando Sentinel, Oct. 2, 2010, http://articles.orlandosentinel.com (follow the 
“Index by Date” hyperlink; then select “2010” in the “Year” field, “Oct” in the “Month” 
field, and “2” in the “Day” field; then follow “Cops’ ‘knock-and-talk’ tactic draws flak after 
near-fatal shooting” hyperlink). In one instance, a homeowner—fearful of recently es-
caped convicts—answered an early-morning knock at his door armed with a shotgun; he 
did not know that the knock came fro
ded him, he fired the shotgun but missed the officer. Id. In response, the officer 
quickly drew his gun and shot the homeowner through the chin. Id. The officer had 
stopped by the house in a routine knock and talk procedure. Id. Doug Ward, director of a 
police-leadership program at Johns Hopkins University said “[y]ou have to wonder if it’s a 
wise policy . . . . Going to the house at that time of the morning is inherently dangerous 
for the officers and the residents.” Id. 
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tionally protected rights of American citizens.214 When society allows 
police to circumvent the warrant requirement, it implicitly creates two 
our
an create the perception that 
e’
 from looking at the actual motivation of 
F th Amendments: one for minorities and the poor—the likely tar-
gets of knock and talk—and one for everybody else.215 
 Knock and talk brings the tensions between police and inner city 
citizens to their front doors.216 The special protection of the home for 
minorities and the poor is significantly reduced when knock and talk is 
disproportionately applied.217 The curtilage doctrine, coupled with the 
lack of curtilage in most inner city dwellings, allows police to get closer 
to city dwellers than to suburban or rural residents.218 Frequent use of 
knock and talk in this environment c
on s home, considered by the Supreme Court to be one’s “castle,” is 
constantly under siege by the police.219 
 Discussing the legacy of Whren v. United States, David A. Harris 
stated that “[w]hatever else the Fourth Amendment does or used to do, 
it will no longer serve as a tool to prevent racially biased policing.”220 
This applies to knock and talk, as its almost unquestioned acceptance 
by courts has arguably facilitated and encouraged racially-based polic-
ing.221 Whren prevents courts
                                                                                                                      
214 See Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13–14 (1948) (holding that “[t]he point 
of the Fourth Amendment, which is often not grasped by zealous officers, is not that it 
den usual inferences which reasonable men draw 
from
 competitive enterprise of fettering out crime”). 
nts.”); Foley, supra note 43, at 339–41. 
 confine themselves from the increasing gov-
ern
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ies law enforcement the support of the 
 evidence. Its protection consists in requiring that those inferences be drawn by a 
neutral and detached magistrate instead of being judged by the officer engaged in the 
often
215 See Cole, supra note 92, at 31, 44–45. 
216 See Maclin, supra note 168, at 256–57 (“Black males learn at an early age that con-
frontations with the police should be avoided . . . .”); Swingle & Zoellner, supra note 40, at 
25. 
217 See Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206, 211 (1966); Amsterdam, supra note 55, at 
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the arrest and search warrant requireme
218 See Leonetti, supra note 44, at 310–11, 316–17 (“If privacy is confined only to areas 
that are exclusively occupied by a single tenant, then most Americans would be left with 
only a few hundred square feet in which to
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police officers, while McCleskey v. Kemp may prevent any disparate im-
pact statistical challenges.222 
 Knock and talk, however, still has a negative effect when applied 
disproportionately to citizens of inner city neighborhoods.223 For exam-
ple, targeting minority populations with techniques such as knock and 
talk can perpetuate negative stereotypes and distrust of authority within 
the community.224 Knock and talk relies heavily on the discretion of po-
lice officers, with no probable cause or warrant requirement to serve as 
a check on their actions.225 Therefore, police often rely on intuition or 
hunches in deciding on which doors to knock.226 Subtle and uncon-
                                                                                                                      
222 See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996); McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 
279, 292–93 (1987). 
223 See Cole, supra note 92, at 44–45 (noting that quality of life policing “relies heavily 
on inherently discretionary police judgments about which communities to target, which 
individuals to stop, and whether to use heavy-handed or light-handed treatment for rou-
tine infractions”). Cole questions the benefit of this approach, asking “do the reduced 
crime rates justify subjecting inner-city residents to more frequent and intrusive searches 
and seizures?” Id. at 45. Scholars have debated whether “quality of life” policing has been 
successful in reducing the levels of crime in areas with high levels of illegal activity. See id. 
at 44–45; Sarah Lyons & Nastassia Walsh, Justice Policy Institute, Money Well 
Spent: How Positive Social Investments Will Reduce Incarceration Rates, Im-
prove Public Safety, and Promote the Well-Being of Communities 21 (2010). In 
Washington, D.C., for example, there has been an increase in spending on policing as 
compared to a decrease in spending on social services and programs. Lyons & Walsh, 
supra, at 9. Spending on corrections increased by 25.3% from 2005 to 2009, while spend-
ing on social programs such as the D.C. Public Schools, the Department of Mental Health, 
and the Department of Housing and Community Development decreased 17.86%, 
19.48%, and 30.42%, respectively, from 2008 to 2010. Id. at 9–10. These spending changes 
occurred despite a decrease in crime rates, with 2009 marking one of the lowest homicide 
rates in the history of the city. Id. at 11. With respect to the increase in arrests, African-
Americans are overrepresented in the criminal justice system, making up eighty-nine per-
cent of those in custody, despite making up only fifty-four percent of the population. Id. at 
11, 17. Sarah Lyons and Nastassia Walsh recommend that law enforcement efforts should 
focus “on the most serious offenses rather than quality of life offenses” and “[a]ddress 
racial and income disparities in arrest and incarceration practices.” Id. at 21. Even if qual-
ity of life policing sometimes successfully reduces crime in cities or neighborhoods, its 
effe  note 98, at 126–
28. 
vel of reasonable suspicion, but reasonable suspicion is not 
req
ct on the targeted population should still be noted. See Harris, supra
Harris notes that, for community policing to be successful, trust is required between 
the community and the police officers who work in that community. See id. Policing meth-
ods that “create the perception of racial and other biases in law enforcement,” however, 
destroy that trust. Id. at 128. 
224 See Bradley, supra note 29, at 1104–05; Foley, supra note 43, at 339. 
225 See Bradley, supra note 29, at 1099, 1104–05. The Supreme Court has held that a 
hunch does not rise to the le
uired to engage in a knock and talk. See David Louis Raybin, Who’s There? The Parameters 
of Police “Knock and Talk” Tactics, 43 Tenn. B.J. 12, 13 (2007). 
226 See Bradley, supra note 29, at 1104–05 (arguing that knock and talk is a targeted 
technique used by police to enter the homes of individuals suspected of crimes, even dur-
ing the investigatory stages). 
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scious biases of officers and society at large may perpetuate stereotypes 
that members of a certain race or community are subject to intrusive 
olic
the local community explode in black neighborhoods.”230 Because of 
p e action.227 Knock and talk is generally used to detect drug activity 
in inner cities, but “one wonders . . . if police would find similar law-
breaking if they focused on affluent Caucasian neighborhoods.”228 
 When negative stereotypes are perpetuated, a sense of antagonism 
can develop between the police and the public they are supposed to 
protect.229 Maclin states that “[t]oday, when the pressure to ‘get tough’ 
on crime is mixed with biased, over-aggressive, and sometimes hostile 
police conduct, it is not surprising that tensions between the police and 
                                                                                                                      
227 See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21–22 (1968) (holding that an objective standard of 
the officer’s seizure of an individual is required because “[a]nything less would invite in-
trusions upon constitutionally guaranteed rights based on nothing more substantial than 
inarticulate hunches, a result this Court has consistently refused to sanction.”); Foley, supra 
note 43, at 339–41 (stating that “when police do not have to give reasons for discretionary 
searches or seizures, conscious and unconscious racism may prevail.”). The Honorable 
Harold Baer, Jr., a federal judge of the Southern District of New York, criticized the discre-
tion allowed to police for using “hunches” in targeting individuals suspected of crime. See 
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old Baer, Jr., Got a Bad Feeling? Is That Enough? The Irrationality of Police Hunches, 4 J.L. 
Econ. & Pol’y 91, 100 (2007). Judge Baer argues that “[u]nlike the ordinary citizen, po-
lice officers face hostile and frightening situations daily and consequently fall easy victim 
to unconscious feelings of bias, prejudice, and the availability heuristic.” Id. Judge Baer 
states that “even the most well-intentioned police officer has unconscious biases, which 
adversely affect her ability to form accurate hunches.” Id. at 99. 
228 Foley, supra note 43, at 341 (stating that police “would find cocaine, marijuana, pre-
scription drugs—the whole apothecary. But these affluent whites just do not look like 
criminals to many people in our society, especially to the police”) (footnote omitted). Pro-
fessor Albert Alschuler discusses five reasons why courts should not defer to police officer 
ches: unreliability, racial bias, disparate racial burden, perjury of police officers, and 
lack of reviewability. See Albert W. Alschuler, The Upside and Downside of Police Hunches and 
Expertise, 4 J.L. Econ. & Pol’y 115, 119 (2007). With respect to disparate racial burden (or 
racial taxation), Alschuler notes that “[r]ational hunches that maximize the number of 
arrests and give taxpayers the most bang for the buck can subject innocent blacks to un-
wanted encounters with the police at a far higher rate than innocent whites.” Id. at 127–28. 
229 See Cole, supra note 92, at 170–71 (“Where a community views the criminal law as 
just, such cooperation can be assumed. But where a community views the law as unjust, 
enforcement is subverted.”). Polls affirm these perceptions, as a U.S. Justice Department 
Survey administered in 1995 found that thirty-one percent of blacks nationwide expressed 
“a great deal or quite a lot” of confidence in the police, compared to sixty-five percent of 
whites. Id. at 170–71. The Supreme C
 “[o]fficers are permitted—indeed, e
 ‘in many circumstances this is cause for assurance, not discomfort.’” See King, 131 S. 
Ct. at 1861 (quoting United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 204 (2002)). The Court went 
on to state that “[c]itizens who are startled by an unexpected knock on the door or by the 
sight of unknown persons in plain clothes on their doorstep may be relieved to learn that 
these persons are police officers.” Id. 
230 Maclin, supra note 168, at 243–44. 
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spicions.233 Ul-
timately, knock and talk has few limitations, but that does not mean it 
should be a commonly emplo hnique.234 
likely to 
dr
f criminal 
behavior, society should question whether it is willing to sacrifice the 
sanctity of the home for the sake of uncovering criminality. 
                                                                                                                     
these tensions, individuals living in inner cities are more likely to see 
police as hostile, even if they are not doing anything illegal.231 When 
viewed in the context of the inner city, the justification for knock and 
talk as a consensual encounter between state and citizen is implausi-
ble.232 The minority citizen faces two choices when a police officer 
comes knocking on his door: consent to the officer despite an un-
friendly and hostile presence, or reject and heighten su
yed policing tec
Conclusion 
 Scholars have pontificated about pretextual stops of minorities on 
the roadways, but police also target minorities in other locations.  
Knock and talk is one tool in the arsenal of police techniques that can 
be an extremely powerful means to obtain information and evidence. 
Because of the settled case law, the Supreme Court seems un
ad ess the problems inherent in knock and talk. Courts that reaffirm 
its constitutionality neglect to note its effects on communities. 
 Furthermore the curtilage doctrine does not provide sufficient 
protection to high-density, multiple occupancy apartment buildings. 
Because warrant and probable cause requirements do not apply to 
knock and talk, there is no restriction on its targets or frequency of use. 
While knock and talk is successful in obtaining evidence o
 
231 See Harris, supra note 98, at 11, 117; Harris, supra note 94, at 677–78; Maclin, supra 
note 168, at 255–57. Harris argues that “racial profiling and other racially biased methods 
of law enforcement corrode the basic legitimacy of the entire American system of justice, 
from policing to the courts to the law itself.” See Harris, supra note 98, at 117. He also 
discusses how high-discretion police tactics “allow police to detain, question, and search 
people who have exhibited no concrete evidence of wrongdoing . . . .” Id. at 11. 
232 See Strauss, supra note 36, at 244. 
233 See Harris, supra note 98, at 36–37 (describing how police obtain consent to search 
vehicles on the highway); Harris, supra note 94, at 677–78; Maclin, supra note 168, at 255–
57; Swingle & Zoellner, supra note 40, at 25. Harris states that, for many African-Americans, 
“[i]f you don’t give consent, the officer will push you. If you persist, the officer will imply 
that you have something to hide . . . .” Harris, supra note 98, at 36–37. 
234 See Bradley, supra note 29, at 1104 (noting that officers are scrutinized when a po-
lice action includes severe coercion, such as yelling and drawn firearms). 
